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The financial crisis of 2007–09 quickly spread from
financial markets and institutions in the US to those
in many parts of the rest of the world,and in partic-
ular to institutions in the UK and continental Eu-
rope.Many of the largest institutions in the US,UK
and the rest of the European Union have required
substantial injections of public funds,in part because
of the lack of easily invoked resolution methods to
recapitalize or reorganize institutions without evok-
ing costly general bankruptcy procedures that would
entail long delays and possibly lead to severe ne-
gative externalities that would endanger the func-
tion of the financial system as a whole or individual
markets.
The problems the US has experienced in dealing with
the resolution of the financial difficulties of American
International Group (AIG) serve as a case study of
the issues that arise in attempting to deal with finan-
cial distress in a large international financial institu-
tion,be it a bank or other form of financial conglom-
erate. Already, the U.S. government has committed
more than $180 billion in financial support to AIG,
which exceeds the estimated cost of the Savings and
Loan crisis of the 1980s.The lessons learned from this
experience should play an important role in shaping
future financial reforms applicable to the US as well
as many other countries.This paper reviews the issues
and points to possible needed reforms to deal with
the failures and financial distress of large multi-na-
tional financial institutions.
Background on AIG
AIG was a large, complex insurance conglomerate
with three main lines of insurance activities.These in-
cluded property and casualty insurance; life and
health insurance and retirement products; and asset
management and financial services.1 The company
had about $1 trillion in consolidated assets and most
relevant for the issues under consideration here,it op-
erated in about 140 countries.It had more than 71 in-
surance companies based in the US and over 175 oth-
er insurance and financial services companies char-
tered in the US and in other countries. Much atten-
tion has been given to one segment of its operations
– the activities of AIG Financial Products that creat-
ed most of AIG’s credit default swaps and ran its se-
curities lending program.While as a US chartered en-
tity its headquarters were located in the US, most of
its activities were based in London and were con-
ducted through the London branch of AIGFP’s
French chartered bank subsidiary, Banque AIG
(Eisenbeis 2009a). This structure clearly was a com-
plicating factor for US authorities in assessing conse-
quences of AIG’s possible demise,not to mention the
impacts on its insurance activities.
There was no one insurance regulator or a consoli-
dated federal insurance regulator responsible for
AIG’s insurance activities. US law (the McCarran-
Ferguson Act) provides that insurance activities,like
those of AIG, are regulated by the individual states
in which insurance companies are licensed to oper-
ate.2 Many of AIG’s other activities were in affili-
ates or subsidiaries that were either technically un-
regulated or were subject to oversight by non-US
authorities.
* Chief Monetary Economist, Cumberland Advisors, Vineland,
New Jersey.
1 It also had an airplane leasing business.
2For example,the NY State Insurance Department representative’s
testimony specifically indicated that he was responsible only for
AIG’s insurance activities, which accounted for only about 10 of
AIG’s 71 US insurance companies,and that he was not responsible
for AIG’s other activities, especially AIG Financial Products
(AIGFP).However,AIG became a Savings and Loan Holding
Company in 1999 and owned three federal savings
banks.As such,AIG was subject to consolidated fed-
eral supervision by the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS),and this oversight extended to AIG’s Financial
Products Group (AIGFP),the activities of which ma-
ny believe were responsible for AIG’s financial diffi-
culties. Hence, while some of AIG’s activities and/or
subsidiaries and affiliates technically may have been
unregulated, this did not mean that they were unsu-
pervised nor subject to federal oversight.3
On the heels of the failure of Lehman Brothers on
16 September 2008 and the merger of Merrill-Lynch
with the Bank of America,the immediate catalyst for
the extreme actions taken by the Federal Reserve and
US Treasury to bail out AIG was the recognition that
AIG’s need for capital might force it to declare im-
mediate bankruptcy.The continued decline in AIG’s
stock price was indicative of questions in the market
about its ability to continue to access short term cap-
ital markets and its need for an estimated USD 80 bil-
lion or so in additional capital because of the deteri-
oration of its real estate securities.
Why did the government step in and rescue AIG?
In justifying their intervention with AIG,policy mak-
ers argued that they were concerned about systemic
risk and the negative effects that a disorderly wind
down of the institution would have on financial mar-
kets, both domestic and international. But the exact
nature of the risks, how they would materialize or
how they might affect the financial markets have yet
to be clearly spelled out. In fact, the reasons given
vary depending upon who is opining on the AIG case.
For example,the following quotation from Chairman
Bernanke (2009b) illustrates the broad view taken by
the Fed and Treasury about the nature of the systemic
risk posed by AIG without specifically making any at-
tempt to define or flesh out the factors that might
identify a systemically important institution: “In the
case of AIG, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
judged that a disorderly failure would have severely
threatened global financial stability and the perfor-
mance of the US economy.”
These comments do not mention the nature of AIG’s
business nor concerns about the interconnected as-
pects of its relationships.Rather they focus on the un-
specified and amorphous likely costs of its demise.
Chairman Bernanke (2009a) put a bit more flesh on
his view of the concept: “In a crisis, the authorities
have strong incentives to prevent the failure of a
large,highly interconnected financial firm,because of
the risks such a failure would pose to the financial sys-
tem and the broader economy.”
The implication is that the size of a firm and the na-
ture of its business are important in identifying a sys-
temically important institution.However,Vice Chair-
man Kohn (2009) quickly offered quite a different
view in his testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, in a verbal
response to a question about systemic risk, how the
Fed viewed AIG and why it intervened: “Let me be
clear… Our actions were not aimed at AIG or its
counterparties. Our actions were aimed at the US fi-
nancial system and the knock-on effects of imposing
losses on counterparties.Would those counterparties
be willing to do business with other systemically im-
portant US institutions that might someday end up in
the government’s hands?”
This view states that the Fed acted because of the
possible reactions of the counterparties of other
unidentified US institutions that might be taken over
by the government at some unspecified time in the
future. This contradicts the rationale offered by
Chairman Bernanke (2009b) in a subsequent speech
on 14 April 2009:
Many other serious consequences would have
followed from a default by AIG: Insurance pol-
icyholders would have faced considerable un-
certainty about the status of their policies; state
and local governments, which had lent more
than $10 billion to AIG, would have suffered
losses; workers whose 401(k) plans had pur-
chased $40 billion of insurance from AIG against
the risk of loss would have seen that insurance
disappear; and holders of AIG’s substantial
quantities of commercial paper would have also
borne serious losses.
Conceivably, its failure could have triggered a
1930s-style global financial and economic melt-
down,with catastrophic implications for produc-
tion, incomes, and jobs.
Finally in testimony before the House Financial
Services in March, Treasury Secretary Geithner
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(2009) offered a somewhat different reason why the
agencies made the decision to rescue AIG:
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York,acted to prevent the
collapse of AIG.That action was based on a judg-
ment, a collective judgment, that AIG’s failure
would have caused catastrophic damage,damage
in the form of sharply lower equity prices and
pension values,higher interest rates,and a broad-
er loss of confidence in the world’s major finan-
cial institutions. This would have intensified an
already deepening global recession and we did
not have the ability to contain that damage by
other means.We did not have the authority to un-
wind AIG.
These descriptions of the rationale for AIG’s rescue
by the key parties involved expand significantly up-
on both the traditional concepts of systemic risk and
the reasons for special treatment of banking organi-
zations. The original reason for government regula-
tion of banks and the provision of deposit insurance
was to shortcut the adverse effects that information
asymmetries and negative externalities might have on
the payments system, which could also cause prob-
lems for the real economy. A massive conversion of
deposit funds from banks into currency could spill
over to healthy banks,become contagious and lead to
a cumulative collapse of credit and the money sup-
ply.4 The abrupt withdrawal of funds from healthy
banks without sufficient access to short term liquidi-
ty to meet that demand could result in their collapse.
The concern about short term liquidity has also
played an important role in the theoretical literature
when a sudden shock to asset prices,like that experi-
enced by US real estate,can cause a system wide liq-
uidity crisis.This theoretical view helps in part to ex-
plain the initial interpretation of the US financial cri-
sis as a problem of liquidity,because large banks were
unable to continue to fund themselves in the short
term asset backed commercial paper market as cred-
it spreads widened and the decline in asset values trig-
gered collateral calls. Essentially the same problem
happened to AIG, which faced collateral calls on its
credit default swaps and experienced difficulties in its
securities lending program.
But viewing the current problems of financial insti-
tutions as a liquidity problem is looking at the short-
term consequences of a much deeper problem.When
counterparties begin to be concerned about repay-
ment of even short-term borrowings, then this is, at
root, a concern about solvency.This is a far cry from
the short-term liquidity problems caused by tradi-
tional runs on banks. This happens when depositors
suddenly show up at a bank’s teller window demand-
ing repayment of their par deposits. The institution
may be solvent but simply has insufficient cash on
hand to meet those withdrawal requests and lacks suf-
ficient time to liquidate marketable assets to meet
those demands. The justifications offered for inter-
vention in AIG go beyond the traditional concerns
about runs on banks.
Consider what typically happens when a bank fails
and how that failure is resolved and its negative ex-
ternalities averted. When a bank cannot meet its
obligations or pay out its deposits in full, it goes into
default, it is closed; insured depositors are paid the
par value of their claims and losses are allocated
among creditors and equity holders according to their
priority in bankruptcy.The whole process,engineered
by the FDIC, usually takes place over a weekend. In
most instances the institution is re-opened on the fol-
lowing Monday, either having been acquired by an-
other bank or as a temporary government-owned,
newly chartered bridge bank.Insured depositors have
access to the par value of the deposits, other unin-
sured creditors may have partial access to their funds
and lending continues under near normal conditions.
When other US firms and European banks or
European non-bank firms fail,the resolution process
can typically can take months (Eisenbeis 2006).In the
meanwhile creditors are denied access to their funds
and services may be curtailed.Because of the impor-
tance of bank deposits as a medium of exchange,such
delays were regarded as unacceptable and special
bankruptcy provisions were enacted in the US en-
abling the institution to be closed by the primary
chartering authority and the FDIC can begin the res-
olution process with the aim of opening the banks the
next business day.5
The concerns about AIG, as expressed in these dif-
ferent policies,seems to include three main consider-
ations: 1) the possible spillover effects related to the
4 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have built a model that describes
when participating in a run and suspension of convertibility of de-
posits represent optimal depositor and bank behavior. See also
Chari and Jagannanthan(1988), Chari(1989), Jacklin(1987), Jacklin
and Bhattacharya(1988) and Wallace(1988).
5 See Bliss and Kaufman (2006) for a comparison of bank and non-
bank bankruptcy procedures.unwinding of its derivative and credit default swap
contracts, 2) the possible problems caused to AIG’s
insurance contract holders, and 3) a general and
amorphous fear that its demise might cause a gener-
alized, worldwide financial panic. None of these is-
sues,except for perhaps the third,conform to the tra-
ditional concerns that specialized bankruptcy proce-
dures were designed to remedy for banks.
What prevented US authorities from closing AIG?
Throughout the current crisis US officials have re-
peatedly complained that they lacked the necessary
authority to windup institutions like Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers and AIG in a prompt and efficient
manner.To simply say that regulators needed to have
the authority to put AIG into a bank-type insolven-
cy and to resolve it the way banks are resolved is too
simplistic when it comes to large multinational orga-
nizations like AIG or even large US or European
multinational banks. The authority of a home-coun-
try authority to close the parent organization,such as
AIG, really has limited reach because of the large
number of foreign chartered affiliates and sub-
sidiaries that a large, multinational firm may own.
In AIG’s case, a good part of its problems emanated
from the transactions that were originated in one way
or another through a London office of a French-
charted bank subsidiary of AIG’s Finanical Products
Group. Even if the Fed or Treasury, for example,
could have closed AIG’s parent holding company,this
would not have permitted them to resolve many of
the transactions that were at the root of AIG’s prob-
lems. A sovereign authority cannot grant one of its
agencies legal authority to close and resolve an enti-
ty chartered by another sovereign state.In the case of
multination entities the resolution of such a failure
can entail both agency problems and conflicts with
other sovereigns and their regulators, each legiti-
mately seeking to protect their citizens and claims.To
suggest that US authorities could successfully deal
with this issue, should one of its major banking insti-
tutions become insolvent, is not credible.
Failure and problems of institutional resolution 
Many practical issues arise, should a large multina-
tional financial institution experience financial diffi-
culties and need to be resolved. The sheer size and
complexity of modern multinational financial institu-
tions clearly impacts the feasibility as well as efficien-
cy of resolving insolvencies, where efficiency here
means minimizing the costs to home and host country
governments and customers. With different insolven-
cy regimes applicable to affiliates and subsidiaries,
even sorting out who would be responsible for what
claims would be a daunting task,even if there was close
co-operation and co-ordination among the responsi-
ble agencies. In general, however, cross border co-or-
dination and decision making would be extremely dif-
ficult, especially in the absence of explicit ex ante
plans.Such firms are subject to multiple regulatory ju-
risdictions and regulators,as well as many different le-
gal systems, which may even be in conflict with each
other. In addition, the quality of host country moni-
toring and supervision may complicated, as it was in
the case of AIG for the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) because of the need to co-ordinate with AIG’s
multiple regulatory authorities and because of the far-
flung nature of its insurance and financial services ac-
tivities. Furthermore, because the same claims might
be treated differently by each responsible country,
there might be incentives for individuals as well as the
company experiencing financial distress to engage in
intra company funds transfers that might delay the set-
tlement and disposition of claims.
With the computerization of records and the cen-
tralization of operations,it is technically feasible to
separate the operational and legal structures of an
organization,so that the legal structure bears no re-
lationship nor adequately captures the interdepen-
dence among subsidiaries and affiliates.Often both
data and processing are located in home or multi-
ple host countries to ensure 24/7 operations as mar-
kets open and close around the world. The frag-
mented nature of both an institution’s organization
and its information and operational structure will
only increase the costs to regulators of gaining
meaningful information on the cross-subsidiary
linkages and the true nature and extent of its coun-
terparty exposures.
Lack of information may also adversely affect the
quality of both home and host country monitoring
and supervision because regulators are generally less
able to obtain useful financial information from do-
mestically chartered,foreign-owned institutions than
from domestically-owned institutions. In some in-
stances,key management,records and processing ca-
pabilities may not even be located in any countries
where financial affiliates or subsidiaries may be char-
tered.Thus,barriers posed by information costs,con-
CESifo DICE Report 2/2009 16
ForumCESifo DICE Report 2/2009 17
Forum
straints on the ability of supervisors to assess the
health of an institution and difficulties in identifying
an institution’s counter parties can pose considerable
problems, especially when an institution’s access to
liquidity and funds may vanish quickly.For these rea-
sons, timely resolution of a troubled entity may in-
volve the co-operation and co-ordination of multiple
regulators and chartering agencies across wide geo-
graphic areas and time zones,even when some of the
legal-entities may appear to be sound according to
their financial records. With such organizational
structures the failure of an organization may make it
impossible to rescue or keep open independently
chartered subsidiaries and affiliates in the home
countries where they are chartered in an effort to
maintain key business relationships and provide cus-
tomer access to services.
At the same time financial institution regulators nat-
urally have a home-country bias and will likely re-
spond to a problem in what they consider is the best
interest of their country and its citizens (Bollard
2005). For these reasons, it is generally infeasible, as
well as inefficient and costly to physically dispose of
or liquidate large complex financial institutions when
they are declared insolvent and closed legally.
In the case of AIG, its insurance activities were frag-
mented across many states and many different for-
eign countries, each with separate authorities, rules
and regulations. This greatly complicated the OTS’s
consolidated supervisor responsibilities. Further-
more,these insurance subsidiaries were participating
in a securities lending program,with the proceeds be-
ing invested in mortgage related securities through a
non-banking subsidiary (AIGFP) using a subsidiary
bank as a conduit.6 The true risks to the insurance
business lines could have only been assessed only by
an entity with access to AIG’s internal records on a
consolidated basis.
A similar information problem existed, for example,
for the bank supervisors of AIGs bank counterpar-
ties.Given that European banking supervision is left
to the individual countries and is dependent upon co-
ordination and co-operation, it is little wonder that
we have not heard much about European banks
broad exposure to AIG.
Conclusions: actions to deal with financial difficul-
ties in large financial institutions
A number of policy makers have made suggestions
and recommendations to expedite the resolution of
possible failures of large, systemically important in-
stitutions. Simply granting closure responsibility to
a responsible agency,without either defining ex ante
which institutions should be subject to a regime that
does not address the complexity of the resolution
process or that does not confront the legal difficul-
ties in dealing with a multinational institution with
perhaps hundreds of independently chartered affil-
iates and subsidiaries, fails to solve the problem.
Moreover, it is not clear that appointing a systemic
risk authority would be effective, especially given
the potential conflicts that might arise when it comes
to the independent conduct of monetary policy
(Eisenbeis and Wall 1999). Consider, for example,
the 2002–04 period. Would a systemic risk authori-
ty, if lodged with an agency outside the Fed, have
forced the Fed to begin raising interest rates as hous-
ing was leading the US out of the recession? If the
Fed had had the responsibility at that time would it
have conducted policy differently? Formalizing sys-
temic risk responsibility seems at best to simply be
a substitute for avoiding the pursuit of destabilizing
monetary and fiscal policies and lax financial insti-
tution supervision.
The following is a list of objectives and policies that
should be the focus of regulatory reform efforts.
Regulatory initiatives not requiring legislation
1. Limit excessive leverage on the part of financial
institutions by imposing a maximum leverage con-
straint – excessive leverage by financial institu-
tions made them vulnerable to a decline in credit
quality.
a) Focus on capital that would be at risk and
available to avoid losses – there are really on-
ly two types of liabilities in banks,for example,
guaranteed liabilities and liabilities capable of
absorbing losses.
b) Abandon risk-based capital concepts. Re-
gulators should not be involved in internal
capital allocation decisions.
2. Focus supervisory efforts on the consolidated en-
tity and look through legal affiliates and sub-
sidiaries when assessing a firm’s financial condi-
tion.If legal structure represents a potential res-
6 In many instances, the individual state insurance regulators were
empowered to restrict or reverse certain intra company transfers of
funds and activities.For example,the state regulators were the ones
that forced AIGFP to unwind AIG’s securities lending program in
an attempt to protect the reserves backing the insurance contracts
in the state in which that insurance subsidiary was chartered.olution problem, then this should both be iden-
tified and be a focus of regulatory and supervi-
sory co-ordination and co-operation.
3. Address the issue of organizational complexity:
Charge complex institutions for the cost of su-
pervision and examination to introduce a cost to
complexity.
4. Seek to ensure that failures of financial firms are
isolated events: Make an unwinding scenario part
of the supervision of each large,complex financial
institution.
Initiatives requiring legislative action
1. Consider restricting derivatives above the first
degree.
a) Complex instruments whose cash flows are 
dependent upon fund flows from other com-
plex instruments serve little useful economic
purpose relative to the risks.
b) Consider restricting naked swaps.
c) Put derivatives on exchanges structured like
current futures exchanges.
2. For large, complex financial institutions focus in-
ternational co-ordination and harmonization of
supervision, regulation, deposit insurance cover-
age, and bankruptcy procedures.
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